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This paper presents a general equilibrium model for 
the production, trafficking, and consumption of illegal 
drugs which endogenously determines relative prices and 
quantities. The model is calibrated to characterize the 
market for cocaine and is used to analyze the effects of 
three types of policies: making the illegal activities riskier, 
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increasing the penalties for conducting illegal activities, 
and legalizing previously illegal activities. Assessing the 
effects of these policies using the powerful tool of a 
general equilibrium model provides illuminating (and in 
cases surprising) results.Evo, Pablo, Tony, Diego, and Sonny:
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1 Introduction
Drug use is widely blamed for a broad range of personal and social ills. Drug users are said
to suﬀer diminished health and decreased earnings. Similarly, the market in illegal drugs
is said to promote crime and corrupt law enforcement oﬃcials and politicians (Miron and
Zwiebel, 1995).
The most common response to these perceptions is the belief that governments should
prohibit production, sale, and use of illegal drugs. Policy measures often adopted to decrease
the demand of illegal drugs include stiﬀer penalties to consumers, treatment on heavy users,
and educational campaigns. Policies intended to reduce the supply include crop eradication,
interdiction, and stiﬀer penalties to producers and traﬃckers. While signi￿cant resources
have been allocated to these activities, the results appear not to be encouraging. A small
but vocal minority suggests that prohibition causes many of the problems associated with
illegal drugs and policies other than prohibition (including legalization) might be preferable.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eO ﬃce of National Drug Control Policy, between 1986 and 2003 the
United States government has spent an average of almost 13 billion dollars a year (in dollars
of the year 2000) in policies intended to control the production and consumption of illegal
drugs (marijuana, cocaine, crack, stimulants, LSD, PCP, and heroin). These expenditures
increased rapidly from 1986 to 1992, growing at an annual rate of 22%. From 1992 until
2001, the average annual growth rate of these expenditures was of 2%. Beginning in 2002
these expenditures have declined signi￿cantly (by almost 7 billion dollars between 2001 and
2003), reaching levels comparable to the ones of 1989-1990 (Table 7 of the Appendix).
On average, 34% of the expenditures were destined to policies intended to decrease the
demand of illegal drugs (prevention and treatment) and the remaining 66% to policies in-
tended to reduce the supply of illegal drugs (domestic law, interdiction, and international
expenditures).1 These shares have not been constant, and beginning in the year 2002, the
participation of expenditures on treatment and expenditures outside the US have increased.
According to the FBI and the Department of Justice, the number of drug users has
remained stable since 1989 (approximately 31 million persons).2 Furthermore, in the year
2004, 12.5% of the arrests made in the United States (1.7 million out of 14 million) were for
drug abuse violations. This ￿gure does not consider crimes that may have been drug related.
Despite the prevalence and magnitude of the problem, the methodological framework
1The main diﬀerence among these components is that Domestic Law expenditures are incurred inside
the United States, Interdiction expenditures are incurred in the United States border, and International
expenditures are incurred outside the United States (see the Appendix).
2The preferences of drug users in the United States have changed in the past years. Cocaine use has
decreased and has been substituted by consumption of synthetic drugs that are more potent, addictive,
cheaper, and easier to produce. On the other hand, consumption of cocaine in Europe and Latin America
has continued to increase.
1commonly used to analyze it relies on partial equilibrium models.3 In a market with complex
interactions, key aspects that can help to better understand how diﬀerent policies shape
prices and modify incentives are certain to be missed with this approach. By its own nature, a
partial equilibrium approach will ignore the feedback eﬀects between prices, policies, and the
consequent reactions of the agents. In general equilibrium, prices and actions are endogenous
to policies.
This paper presents a general equilibrium model that can be used to assess the eﬀects of
alternative policies. The model is dynamic, stochastic, and internally consistent. Optimal
a c t i o n sa n dp r i c e sa r ed e t e r m i n e da sar e s u l to fh o wa g e n t sp e r c e i v et h el a w so fm o t i o no f
the state variables and the policies undertaken by the authority. Furthermore, the model
assumes that markets are competitive but that there are risks involved in devoting resources
to illegal activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic general equilibrium
model used. Section 3 calibrates the model and specializes it to the cocaine market.4 Section
4 reports the long-run eﬀects of alternative policies. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 A General Equilibrium Model
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model presented below considers the existence
of ￿ve representative agents:
￿ Crop Producer (Agent E)
￿ Drug Producer (Agent P)
￿ Drug Traﬃcker (Agent T)
￿ Drug Consumer (Agent D)
￿ Government or Law Enforcement Agency (Agent S)
Next, we describe the optimization problem faced by each agent, the optimality condi-
tions, and the equilibrium conditions that jointly determine actions and prices.
2.1 The Crop Producer
This model generalizes the acreage supply response model of Chavas and Holt (1990). At
any point in time the representative agent can devote his time to produce a good (crop) that
is used as an input for producing a drug or to produce a good that is directly consumed.
3Examples of theoretical and empirical papers dealing with drug consumption are Becker and Murphy
(1988), Becker et al (1991), Orphanides and Zervos (1995), Grossman et al (1998), and Beherens et al (1999).
Examples of models for drug traﬃcking (distribution) are Caulkins (1993, 1997). Models that discuss optimal
allocations of resources for preventation, treatment, and enforcement are Rydell et al (1996), Behrens et al
(2000), and Tragler et al (2001).
4The choice of this drug is due to the availability of information. The model is general enough so that
it can be used to study other illegal markets.
2The ￿rst activity is illegal and the second is not. His consumption of the legal good is cE
0,t if
he is not caught producing the illegal crop and cE
1,t if he is. With πE
t denoting the probability






0,t with probability 1 − πE
t
cE























where p is the price (relative to the legal good) at which the illegal crop is sold to the drug
producer, yE
t is the amount of the illegal crop produced, hE
t i st h ea m o u n to ft h el e g a lg o o d
produced, and 0 <τ E
t ≤ 1 is the penalty that is paid if caught producing the illegal crop.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time and derives no utility from leisure. This
unit of time can be devoted to produce the illegal crop (lE
1,t), to produce the legal good
(lE
2,t), or to reduce the probability of getting caught in the production of the illegal crop
(lE
3,t).5 The production functions yE and hE are increasing and strictly concave in lE
1,t and
lE
2,t respectively. Finally, πE






is increasing in the ￿r s tt w oa r g u m e n t sa n d
decreasing in the third, where gE is the level of government expenditures destined to detect
the illegal activity.6



































subject to (1) and the perceived laws of motion of the states xE,w h e r eu(•) is the utility
function that is increasing and concave in consumption, and E is the conditional expectation
operator.7










































































The intratemporal optimality conditions state that the marginal bene￿ts of devoting time
to produce the illegal crop, to reduce the probability of getting caught producing it, and to
produce the legal good must equate.
5This variable can be seen as proxying activities such as violence, corruption of law enforcement oﬃcials
and politicians, etc.
6The timming of uncertainty is such that once the agent commits resources to each activity, a fraction
πE is caught and 1 − πE is not. Note that πE is, in equilibrium, a function of the decisions of the agent.
T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h ep r o b l e m sf a c e db yt h eo t h e ra g e n t s .
7For brevity, time t subscripts are eliminated.
32.2 The Drug Producer
The representative drug producer (agent P) demands the illegal crop from the crop producer
(yP). He can devote his time to combine with yP in order to produce the illegal drug or to
produce the legal good. His consumption of the legal good can be cP
0,t or cP
1,t depending on
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where q is the price at which the illegal drug is sold to the traﬃcker (relative to the legal
good), wP
t is the amount of drug produced, hP
t is the amount of the consumption good
produced, and 0 <τ P
t ≤ 1 is the penalty that is paid if caught producing the illegal drug.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time and derives no utility from leisure. This unit
of time can be devoted to produce the illegal drug (lP
1,t), to produce the legal good (lP
2,t), or
to reduce the probability of getting caught (lP
3,t). The production function hP is increasing
and strictly concave in lP





strictly concave in both arguments. Finally, πP






is increasing in the ￿rst
two arguments and decreasing in the third, where gP is the level of government expenditures
destined to detect the illegal activity.



































subject to (3) and the perceived laws of motion of the states xP.

































































































The ￿rst two optimality conditions state that the marginal bene￿ts of devoting time to
produce the illegal drug, to reduce the probability of getting caught, and to produce the legal
good must equate. The third equation states that the marginal bene￿t from demanding an
extra unit of the illegal crop must equate the marginal cost of acquiring it.
42.3 The Drug Traﬃcker
The representative drug traﬃcker (agent T) demands the illegal drug from the drug producer
(wT). He can devote his time to sell the illegal drug or to produce the legal good. His
consumption of the legal good can be cT
0,t or cT
1,t depending on whether he is not or is caught
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where r is the price at which the illegal drug is sold to the drug consumer (relative to the
legal good), nT
t i st h ea m o u n to fd r u gt r a n s f o r m e db yt h et r a ﬃcker,8 hT
t is the amount of
the legal good produced, and 0 <τ T
t ≤ 1 is the penalty that is paid if caught traﬃcking the
illegal drug.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time and derives no utility from leisure. This unit
of time can be devoted to traﬃc the illegal drug (lT
1,t), to produce the legal good (lT
2,t), or to
reduce the probability of getting caught (lT
3,t). The production function hT is increasing and
strictly concave in lT
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is increasing in the ￿rst two
arguments and decreasing in the third, where gT is the level of government expenditures
destined to detect the illegal activity.



































subject to (5) and the perceived laws of motion of the states xT.

































































































These optimality conditions have similar interpretations to the ones for the drug producer.
8We assume that n is diﬀerent from w as the traﬃc k e rm a ym o d i f yt h ep r o p e r t i e so fw (such as ￿quality￿).
52.4 The Drug Consumer
The problem of the drug consumer is more complex. It relies on the ￿rational addiction￿
literature pioneered by Becker and Murphy (1988). The model generalizes the framework of
Orphanides and Zervos (1995). The representative drug consumer (agent D)d e m a n d st h e
illegal drug from the drug traﬃcker (nD). His consumption of the legal good can be cD
0,t or
cD
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t is the amount of the legal good produced, φt is a consumption tax levied by the
government, and 0 <τ D
t ≤ 1 is the penalty that is paid if caught consuming the illegal drug.
At each period, the agent is endowed with one unit of time and derives utility from
leisure.9 This unit of time can be devoted to demand leisure (lD
1,t), to produce the legal good
(lD
2,t), or to reduce the probability of getting caught (lD
3,t). The production function hD is
increasing and strictly concave in lD
2,t. The probability πD







in the ￿rst two arguments and decreasing in the third, where gD
1 is the level of government
expenditures destined to detect the illegal activity.
As the illegal drug is potentially addictive, the long-lasting eﬀects of past consumption
of nD a r es u m m a r i z e db yt h es t o c kv a r i a b l edD that has the following law of motion:
d
D





where 0 <δ<1 acts as a depreciation rate.



























where u(•) is increasing and concave in leisure and in the consumption of the legal and








and denotes the probability that the agent will experience the detrimental eﬀects of the
consumption of the illegal good and is decreasing in gD
2 and increasing in the stock of illegal







and represents the detrimental side eﬀects of past
consumption. It is increasing in the ￿rst argument and decreasing in the second. Thus, the
second re￿ects the fact that the agent is rationally addicted in the sense that he knows that
there are negative side eﬀects to increased consumption.
9As this agent does not have to devote resources to produce illegal goods, we force him to derive utility
from leisure to avoid trivial solutions for the labor supply.
10The diﬀerence between gD
1 and gD
2 is that the ￿rst considers expenditures that the demand of the illegal
good riskier for the consumer, while the second deals with expenditures that diminish the eﬀects of its use
(for example through educational campaigns or treatment for heavy users).











































subject to (7), (8) and the perceived laws of motion of the states xD.







































































































The ￿rst two optimality conditions state that the marginal bene￿ts of devoting time to
leisure, to reduce the probability of getting caught, and to produce the legal good must
equate. The third and fourth equations determine the optimal demand of the addictive
good where the agent considers all bene￿ts and costs (including the detrimental eﬀects of
becoming addicted).
2.5 The Government
T h eg o v e r n m e n t( a g e n tS) has no explicit objective function to maximize. It chooses the tax



















where gS denotes other expenditures made by the government that do not aﬀect the proba-
bilities of detecting illegal activities.
As the production and consumption of the illegal goods that are con￿scated by agent S
are assumed to be destroyed (not taxed), they do not constitute a source of revenue for the
government.
72.6 Market-Clearing Conditions





































that state that the supply and demand of the illegal crop, illegal drug produced, and illegal
drug traﬃcked must equate.
2.7 Competitive Equilibrium




i (x),f o ri =1 ,2,3 and j =
E,P,T,D, a set of pricing functions p = P (x), q = Q(x) and r = R(x),a n dt h el a w so f
motion of the exogenous state variables x+1 = X (x), such that:
￿ Agents E,P,T, and D solve their respective optimization problems taking x and the
form of the functions P (x), Q(x), R(x),a n dX (x) as given, with the equilibrium




i (x),f o ri =1 ,2,3 and j = E,P,T,D.


























The last equation states that the amount produced by all agents must equate the sum
of private consumption, government expenditures, and the resources lost when agent D is
detected consuming the illegal good. Thus, the equilibrium consumption of the legal good















1,t,f o rj = E,P,T,D.
3 Functional Forms and Calibration
The model just described can be used to analyze any illegal market. Next, we focus on the
analysis of the cocaine market. The reasons are: First, the cocaine market has agents in
diﬀerent locations (coca leaves are mainly produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru; cocaine
is mainly produced in Colombia and transported to consumption centers in the United
States and Europe). Second, a relatively comprehensive data base that includes prices and
quantities is available for this market (see the Appendix). Finally, due to the heterogeneity
of agents involved, several supply and demand policies have been implemented or proposed.
Tables 1 and 2 present the functional forms and parameters used in the exercise. The
utility functions of all agents display constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with respect
to the consumption of the legal good (with the risk aversion coeﬃcient set equal to 2 in all
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1 , for i =0 ,1
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Table 1: Functional Forms
of the illegal drug.11 Consistent with the empirical literature on rational addictions, the
depreciation rate is high and set equal to 80%.
The production functions of the legal good are identical for all agents and the share of
labor is set equal to 0.3 (a number consistent with the macro literature). The production
functions of the illegal goods for agents E, P,a n dT diﬀer. Illegal crop production is assumed
to be more labor intensive than the production of the illegal drug or the legal good. The
production of w and n are less labor intensive. The parameters Aj (for j = E,P,T)a r e
calibrated to match the average relative prices q/p and r/q observed on the data (7.19 and
17.45 respectively, see the Appendix).12
11It is assumed that agent D is the only demander of the illegal good. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
illegal crop is used exclusively to produce the illegal drug. GTZ (a German technical cooperation agency)
estimates that no more than 6% of the total production of coca leaves is used for traditional consumption
in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
12The model assumes perfect competition in every market. Thus, mark-ups in each stage are due solely
to technological and risk factors.
9Preferences
β =0 .95,γ E = γP = γT = γD =2
ψ1 = ψ2 =0 .1,δ=0 .8,ζ= −0.3
Illegal Goods Production Functions
AE =1 , AP =0 .24, AT =0 .12
υE =0 .4, υP =0 .2, υT =0 .1
Legal Good Production Functions
BE = BP = BT = BD =7 0
ϕE = ϕP = ϕT = ϕD =0 .3
Government
τE =0 .6, τP =0 .8, τT =0 .9, τD =0 .2
Table 2: Parameter Values
Government expenditures (GS) are set such that, in steady state, φ is equal to 0.0025
(0.25%) which corresponds to the ratio between total expenditures on drug control and
private consumption for the year 2000.
Finally, the parameters that describe the laws of motion of the probabilities πj (j =
E,P,T,D)a n dθ
D, were obtained by estimating econometric models with proportions data.
To do so, times series realizations of proxies for the probabilities must be constructed. We
proxied πE
t using the ratio between the surface of coca eradicated and the surface cultivated in
Bolivia and Colombia; πP
t was proxied by the ratio between the cocaine seized and estimated
to have been produced in Colombia; πT
t was proxied by the ratio between the cocaine seized
and estimated to have been produced excluding Colombia; πD
t was proxied by the ratio
between the number of people arrested for drug possession and the number of drug users;
and θ

































Table 3: Probabilities. Standard Errors in parenthesis
Once time series of the probabilities were obtained, econometric models using variables
proxying gj were estimated. Table 3 reports the results of the models in which πj (j =
13The Appendix presents the time series constructed and sources used.
10E,P,T,D) were made to depend only on variables exogenous to the agent. In particular,
πE and πP were found to depend on the component of international expenditures, πT on
expenditures on interdiction and domestic law, and πD only on expenditures on domestic
law.14 For the estimation of the parameters that determine the probability of addiction, we






where (as noted above) δ was set equal to 0.8 and nt is the consumption of cocaine. Finally,
the constants on the speci￿cations of the probabilities were set so that in equilibrium they












Figure 1: Fitted Probabilities and Expenditures (logs of billions of US$)




4 are restricted to be equal to 0 (avoiding strategic interactions), the optimization
problem of the agents with respect to the choice of l
j
3 is trivial (l
j
3 =0 ), because there are no bene￿ts on
devoting resources to reduce the probability of getting caught. Models with endogenous probabilities are not
considered here.
15In particular, the constants were set so that in steady state πE =0 .169,π P =0 .075,π T =0 .242,
πD =0 .032, and θ
D =0 .020.
11Figure 1 presents the ￿tted probabilities πj for each agent given diﬀerent values of lng.
A sc a nb ei n f e r r e df r o mt h ec o e ﬃcients reported on Table 3, almost uniformly, expenditures
a r em o r ee ﬀective in detecting crop production, then drug production, drug traﬃcking, and
lastly drug consumption. The estimated probabilities imply that to obtain πE =0 .5,t h e
value of international expenditures should be 3 times higher (1.7 billion US$) than it has
been on average, to obtain πP =0 .5, the value of international expenditures should be 8.1
times higher (4.6 billion US$) than it has been on average, to obtain πT =0 .5,t h ev a l u e
of expenditures on interdiction and domestic law should be 5.8 times higher (46.3 billion
US$) than they has been on average, and to obtain πD =0 .5,t h ev a l u eo fd o m e s t i cl a w
expenditures should be 107 times higher (653.9 billion US$) than it has been on average.
Of course, these ￿gures only convey an idea of the resources that would be needed to make
this activities riskier without assessing the means by which they would be ￿nanced and their
impact on welfare. This is addressed in the next section.
4 Assessing the Eﬀects of Alternative Policies
Several policies have been proposed and enacted on the ￿War on Drugs￿. Next, we use the
m o d e lp r e s e n t e do nS e c t i o n2a l o n gw i t ht h ef u n c t i o n a lf o r m sa n dp a r a m e t e rv a l u e so ft h e
previous section to evaluate the long run eﬀects of alternative policies.16 Given the structure
of the model, we consider three types of policies and evaluate their eﬀects on the actions
taken by each agent and the prices that are determined as a result:
￿ Increased Risk: The ￿rst set of policies evaluates the eﬀects of increases in diﬀerent
components of GS. T h i se x e r c i s ee v a l u a t e st h ee ﬀe c to fp o l i c i e st h a ta ﬀect the risks
involved in each activity but maintains the penalties (τj) constant. As the increased
expenditure must be ￿nanced, we also compute the increases on the consumption tax
of the legal good that are required.
￿ Stiﬀer penalties: Next, we consider the case in which the level of expenditure is main-
tained constant (thus, not changing the risks involved in each activity) but increase
the penalties of the agents when they are caught.
￿ Legalization: There are two equivalent ways by which legalization can be modeled.
One is to force πj to be equal to 0, in which case the level of τj would be irrelevant.
The other is to set τj to zero, in which case, the level of πj would be irrelevant.
4.1 Making Illegal Activities Riskier
As our speci￿cations of πj depend on diﬀerent components of government expenditures, we
make an activity riskier by increasing the appropriate expenditure. We also compute the
new level of the consumption tax required to ￿nance this increase.
The eﬀect of increasing risks in a partial equilibrium model can be compared to an adverse
supply shock that reduces the quantity produced. In general equilibrium, an increased risk
16Transitional dynamics are not considered in this paper.
12for one agent may actually foster illegal activities by the other (as the latter￿s relative risk
has decreased). For example, the eﬀects of increased risks in producing or traﬃcking cocaine
o nt h ep r o d u c t i o na n dr e l a t i v ep r i c eo fc o c al e a v e si sn o to b v i o u s .
Five experiments are conducted by increasing diﬀerent components of GS.T h e ys h a r et h e
characteristic that overall expenditures are increased in 10% (Table 4). The ￿rst experiment
increases all the components of GS proportionally to their average share. In this case, the
risks of producing the illegal crop, producing, traﬃcking, and consuming the illegal drug are
all higher. As expenditures on prevention are also increased, the probability of addiction
decreases. As the share of international expenditures (the most eﬀective in increasing risk) is
relatively small, a 10% increase in overall expenditures produce relatively modest increases
on risks. Production of the illegal goods (and the consumption of the illegal good) decrease,
and the relative prices of them with respect to the legal good increase. The net result
for agent D is that it decreases its expenditures on the illegal good, providing an income
eﬀect that makes him demand more of the legal good. Even though agents E, P, and T
reallocate labor from the illegal to the legal activity and produce more of the legal good, it
is not automatic that their consumption of the legal good will increase.17 As the increased
consumption of the legal good by agent D is relatively modest, ￿nancing this policy would
imply that the consumption tax must be almost doubled (from its original level). In terms of
welfare, agents E and T would be worse oﬀ as they experience the highest increased risks and
agents D and P would be better oﬀ.18 T h eb o t t o ml i n eo ft h i se x e r c i s ei st h a ti fg o v e r n m e n t
expenditures continue to be distributed as they are and the structure of our model provides
a reasonable approximation to the long run characteristics of this market, drug producers
and consumers would be interested in continuing with this policy.
We arrive to similar conclusions with the second experiment in which the increased ex-
penditures are destined solely to international expenditures. In this case, the risks for agents
P and particularly E increase substantially, leaving the risks for other agents unchanged.
In equilibrium, production and consumption of illegal goods reduce drastically, while their
relative prices increase. The income eﬀect (of reduced expenditure of the illegal good) makes
agent D t oc o n s u m em o r eo ft h el e g a lg o o dt h a ni nt h e￿rst experiment, thus making the
increased tax on the consumption of the legal good to by smaller. However, in this exper-
iment, the only agent that is better oﬀ now (due to favorable changes in relative prices)
is agent P.A g e n t D is worse oﬀ because the decreased probability of addiction does not
compensate the reduction of consumption of the illegal good. Summing up, a policy focused
on making riskier to produce the drug may actually be desired by the drug producer (not
the crop producer).
The next two experiments focus on increasing the expenditures on Interdiction (increasing
the risk of the illegal activity of agent T) and on Domestic Law (increasing the risk of the
illegal activities for agents T and D). These experiments can be seen as negative demand
shocks for agents P and E, decreasing the relative prices of the illegal goods they produce.
On the other hand, agent T reallocates labor from illegal to legal activities, but due to the
17Agent D actually reduces its production of the legal good given that the positive income eﬀect of the
reduced expenditure on the illegal good makes him demand more leisure.
18The case of agent P is interesting. The modest increase in the probability of getting caught compounded
by an increase in the relative price of the price at which it sells the good he produces (q) with respect to the
price at which he buys the input (p), makes him actually better oﬀ with this policy.
13Proportional International Interdiction Domstic Law Prevention
Illegal Good
yE -1.22 -5.34 -0.73 -0.77 -0.82
wP -4.10 -29.17 -0.99 -1.04 -1.10
nT -5.04 -35.73 -1.12 -1.18 -1.25
nD -6.20 -35.73 -3.13 -3.18 -1.25
Prices
p 1.52 33.00 -1.60 -1.67 -1.78
q 3.29 58.50 -1.50 -1.58 -1.67
r 4.87 48.01 2.81 2.63 -3.71
Probabilities
πE 4.92 44.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
πP 1.54 15.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
πT 1.06 0.00 1.77 1.77 0.00
πD 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00
θ
D -0.28 -0.87 -0.08 -0.08 -0.81
Legal Good
CE -0.39 -1.34 -0.34 -0.36 -0.38
CP 0.17 2.44 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
CT -0.05 -1.36 0.57 0.50 -1.37
CD 1.43 4.24 0.33 0.61 4.28
Welfare
E ---- -
P ++ - - -
T -- + + -
D +-++ +
Expenditure -1.33 -4.56 -0.07 -0.30 -4.93
Tax 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Table 4: Increased Risks (in percentage points). Expenditure = Change of expenditures of
agent D on the illegal good (in terms of the legal good). Tax = Change on the consumption
tax needed to ￿nance goverment expenditures.
14fact that r rises and that the reduction of expenditures on the illegal good by agent D is
relatively modest, agents T and D are better oﬀ in both cases.
The last experiment increases expenditures solely on Prevention (that decreases the prob-
ability of addiction). This experiment produces a reduction on the demand and relative prices
of the illegal goods. It makes agents E, P,a n dT to reallocate labor from illegal to legal
activities and makes them worse oﬀ.O n l y a g e n tD is better oﬀ as the decreased expendi-
ture on the illegal good produces an income eﬀect that increases his demand for leisure and
consumption of the legal good (more than any other of the experiments considered). This
last fact, makes the increase on the consumption tax to be more modest than in the other
cases.
4.2 Stiﬀer Penalties
The second set of policies considered does not make the illegal activities riskier, but makes
them costlier if the agents are caught. We consider three experiments in which the penalties
for performing illegal activities by agents E, P,a n dT are increased (Table 5).19
Stiﬀer penalties on the crop producer can be seen as a negative supply shock for him.
Production of the illegal crop decreases and its relative price (p) increases. The increased
cost for agent P makes him produce less of the illegal good (another negative supply side
shock) and increases the price of the illegal good sold (q) but not to the same extent of the
increase in p. The same argument is extensive for agent T. The increased price also reduces
the demand for the illegal good by agent D, making him substitute it with consumption of
the legal good. As government expenditures are not changed and the consumption of the
legal good by agent D increases, the consumption tax decreases. Agent D is the only one
that is better oﬀ in this experiment.
The other two experiments are very interesting because they provide results that can
only be obtained when considering general equilibrium models. The second experiment
imposes stiﬀer penalties on the drug producer (agent P). As it makes his activity costlier,
its production falls and its relative price increases (q). On the other hand, this precise
experiment can be seen as a negative demand shock for agent E. The end result is that the
production of the illegal crop reduces as does its relative price (p). The end result is that
the relative price q/p increases and the consumption of the legal good by agent P increases
making him better oﬀ,n o tw o r s eo ﬀ with this policy!20 Agent T is worse oﬀ given that this
experiment can be seen as a negative supply shock and that the relevant relative price for
him (r/q) increases. Finally, agent D is better oﬀ, given that the increased price of the illegal
good makes him consume less of it and more of leisure and the legal consumption good.
The last experiment considers increasing penalties for the drug traﬃcker. Following
the reasoning provided above, this increased cost reduces the demand and price of the drug
produced by agent P, which in turn reduces the demand and price of the illegal crop produced
by agent E (making them worse oﬀ). However, as the activities of agent T are costlier, the
relative price r increases, and even though the volume of drug traﬃcked by agent T decreases,
he is better oﬀ a sh i s￿ t e r m so ft r a d e ￿h a v ei m p r o v e d( r/q) and he can consume more of the
19Stiﬀer penalties such as ￿three strikes and you are out￿ come to mind. We do not report the case of
stiﬀer penalties on consumption as in our model it can be seen as a consumption tax.
20This is the case given that πP does not change.
15τE =1 τP =1 τT =1
Illegal Good
yE -2.92 -1.28 -4.65
wP -8.35 -1.74 -6.23
nT -7.59 -3.00 -7.01
nD -7.59 -3.00 -9.88
Prices
p 10.83 -2.79 -9.72
q 8.52 3.20 -9.05
r 7.15 2.70 9.55
Probabilities
θ
D -0.19 -0.08 -0.25
Legal Good
CE 0.47 -0.59 -2.03
CP -0.02 1.11 -0.56
CT -0.28 -0.11 3.87






Expenditure -0.98 -0.38 -1.28
Tax -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
Table 5: Stiﬀer Penalties (in percentage points). Expenditure = Change of expenditures of
agent D on the illegal good (in terms of the legal good). Tax = Change on the consumption
tax needed to ￿nance goverment expenditures.
legal good. As in other experiments, the consumption tax and expenditures on the illegal
drug by agent D decrease making him consume more of the legal good and demand more
leisure (making him better oﬀ).
4.3 Legalization
The last set of exercises considers the progressive legalization of each of the activities (Table
6). It starts by legalizing crop production,21 then it legalizes drug production as well, it
follows with also legalizing drug traﬃcking, and ￿nally legalizes drug consumption. The last
exercise takes into account that legalization make expenditures on everything but prevention
21The newly elected president of Bolivia (and acting president of the union of coca leaf producers) has
been ￿irting with the idea of legalizing coca leaf production, although he says to vehemently oppose cocaine
production and traﬃcking. As most of the coca crop production is destined for cocaine production, this
attitude can be considered similar to that of a missile producer that favors their production but vehemently
opposes their ￿ring.
16and treatment unproductive. Given that, we also consider the case of legalizing all activities
and allocating all the expenditures to prevention (to reduce the probability of addiction).
EE + PE + P + TE + P + T + DE + P + T + D
+Prevention
Illegal Good
yE 1.18 2.92 18.13 18.89 12.57
wP 10.07 12.62 35.78 36.98 27.13
nT 9.08 17.79 45.32 46.77 34.92
nD 9.08 17.79 85.78 87.64 72.48
Prices
p -10.68 -7.36 28.34 30.51 13.69
q -8.59 -15.55 11.37 12.99 0.41
r -7.28 -13.24 -41.21 -40.42 -46.54
Probabilities
θ
D 0.23 0.46 2.36 2.41 -1.34
Legal Good
CE -0.12 0.67 9.96 10.57 6.00
CP 0.03 -1.41 -0.76 -0.71 -1.06
CT 0.32 0.63 -14.19 -14.18 -14.28
CD -0.98 -1.87 -7.71 -11.44 6.54
Welfare
E ++ + + +
P +- - - -
T ++ - - -
D -- - - +
Expenditure 1.14 2.19 9.23 11.79 -7.80
Tax 0.002 0.005 0.020 0.030 -0.015
Table 6: Legalization (in percentage points). Expenditure = Change of expenditures of
agent D on the illegal good (in terms of the legal good). Tax = Change on the consumption
tax needed to ￿nance goverment expenditures.
Legalizing crop production increase the production and consumption of illegal drugs and
decreases their relative prices. Notably, as p decreases signi￿cantly, consumption of the legal
good by agent E decreases! Even so, as this is no longer a risky activity, welfare of the
crop producer increases. Production and traﬃcking of the illegal good also increase and
their relatively prices fall (though not as sharply as p does). Agents P and T increase their
consumption of the legal good and are better oﬀ in this experiment. The only ￿looser￿ here
is the drug consumer because the increased expenditure on the illegal good, forces him to
demand less leisure and consume less of the legal good. Furthermore, and as a consequence
of the latter, the consumption tax must also increase.
When crop production and drug production are legal, production and consumption of
illegal drugs increase and their prices with respect to the legal good decrease, especially q.
This in turn makes the drug producer worse oﬀ in this experiment! The winners are the
17crop producer and the drug traﬃcker that obtain more income due to the increased demand
of their products. As in the ￿rst case, agent D is worse oﬀ because he expends more of
the illegal good, consumes less of the legal good, demands less leisure, and is more likely to
become addicted.
In the third and fourth experiments, drug traﬃcking and consumption are also legalized.
In these cases the only winner is agent E. What happens is that as the relative price of the
illegal good decreases signi￿cantly for agent D and his demand for it increases, the traﬃcker
and the drug producer demand more of the production of agent E busting the price p.A g e n t
E then has more resources that he can allocate to consume the legal good. On the other
hand, agent P also produces more of the illegal good, increasing q,b u ti t sc o s t s( p)i n c r e a s e
more. As a result, agent P consumes less of the legal good and is worse oﬀ.A g e n tT is in
an even more uncomfortable situation, as the price at which he sells his product decreases
(r) while the cost of the input he uses increases (q). As in the ￿rst exercise, agent D is
also worse oﬀ as he expends more on the illegal good, sees the consumption tax increased,
reduces the consumption of the legal good, and is more likely to become addicted.
The previous exercises considered that even though the previously illegal activities were
legalized, the government was still expending the same amounts on interdiction, domestic
law, and international expenditures. As these resources would cease to be necessary, they
could be used in the only ￿productive￿ activity left (prevention) that could reduce the
probability of addiction of agent D. When this is done, even though the production of the
previously illegal goods and their prices follow the same pattern of the previous exercise, the
increased expenditure on prevention now reduces the probability of addiction. This simple
diﬀerence accounts for the fact that now agent D expends less on the illegal good (even
though he consumes more of the drug). This income eﬀect makes him consume more of
the consumption good, demand more leisure, and witness a reduction on the consumption
tax! As a result, agents D and E bene￿t from this experiment, while the traﬃcker and
drug producer are still worse oﬀ. Thus, without resorting to arguments such as imperfect
competition and without (at least explicitly) considering bene￿ts that could follow from
reduced crimes, legalization is bad for traﬃckers and drug producers, but is good for the
crop producer and may be good for the drug consumer.
5 Concluding Remarks
As drug use is blamed for a broad range of personal and social ills, governments have pro-
hibited their production, sale, and use. Among the policy measures adopted to decrease
the demand of illegal drugs are stiﬀer penalties to consumers, treatment on heavy users,
and educational campaigns. Policies intended to reduce the supply include crop eradication,
interdiction, and stiﬀer penalties to producers and traﬃckers.
While signi￿cant resources have been allocated to these activities, the results appear not
to be encouraging. More importantly, a coherent general equilibrium approach that can
help to assess the eﬀects of alternatives policies has not been developed, and the analysis
has focused on partial equilibrium models. This is dangerous because policies determine
not only responses by the actors, but also modify prices and change incentives. In general
equilibrium, prices and actions are endogenous to policies.
18This paper develops a general equilibrium model that considers the production, traﬃck-
ing, and consumption of illegal goods. The model uses characteristics of popular partial
equilibrium models (such as production under uncertainty and rational addictions) and in-
tegrates them in a coherent framework.
The model is calibrated to characterize the market for cocaine and is used to analyze the
eﬀects of three types of policies: making the illegal activities riskier, increasing the penalties
for conducting illegal activities, and legalizing previously illegal activities. Assessing the
eﬀects of these policies using the powerful tool of a general equilibrium model provides
illuminating (and in cases surprising) results.
For example, increased expenditures destined to deter illegal activities may make drug
producers better oﬀ. What appears to be robust, is that increasing the risk of any illegal
activity makes crop producers worse oﬀ. On the other hand, imposing stiﬀer penalties on il-
legal activities make crop producers worse oﬀ and drug consumers better oﬀ. However, stiﬀer
penalties on drug producers or traﬃckers may make them better oﬀ. Finally, legalization
of previously illegal activities is good for crop producers and is generally disliked by drug
producers and traﬃckers. As the consumption of illegal drugs can increase substantially, the
drug consumer is usually worse oﬀ. Nevertheless, if resources were invested on diminishing
the probability of addiction, legalization may be good for the consumer.22
Even though the model is quite general, it is used in a narrow context. In particular,
we do not consider strategic interactions by which agents may invest resources that allow
them to reduce the probability of getting caught. We also consider that all the markets are
competitive. The paper also addresses steady-state (long run) eﬀects and does not analyze
transitional dynamics. Furthermore, even though this structure lends itself to incorporate
more dynamic and stochastic features (technology shocks, time-to-grow constraints, etc.),
these and other features are promising avenues for further research.
22One crucial positive eﬀect of legalization, namely the reduction of crime and violence, is overlooked
here.
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21AT h e D a t a
The Appendix presents the series used to calibrate the model and estimate the probabilities.
￿ Government Expenditures, Table 7. (Source: The Oﬃce of the National Drug Control
Policy).
￿ Total: United States Government Expenditures in Marijuana, Cocaine, Crack,
Stimulants, LSD, PCP, and Heroin Control (billions of US dollars of the year
2000).
￿ Prevention: Development and implementation of programs that prevent illicit
drug use, keep drugs out of neighborhoods and schools, and provide a safe and
secure environment for all people.
￿ Treatment: Includes behavioral therapy (such as counseling, cognitive therapy, or
psychotherapy), medications, or their combination.
￿ Domestic Law: Cocaine seizures, asset seizures, and arrests of drug dealers and
their agents by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; imprisonment
of convicted drug dealers and their agents.
￿ International: Coca leaf eradication; seizures of coca base, cocaine paste, and the
￿nal cocaine product in the source countries (Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru).
￿ Interdiction: Cocaine seizures and asset seizures by the Customs Service, the
Coast Guard, the U.S. Army, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).
￿ Prices, Table 8.
￿ q/p: Ratio between the price of cocaine exported from Colombia and the price of
coca base.
￿ r/p: Ratio between the consumer price of cocaine and the price of cocaine ex-
ported from Colombia.
￿ Risks, Table 9.
￿ πE: Ratio between surface of coca leaves eradicated and surface cultivated in
Bolivia and Colombia. (Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report).
￿ πP: Ratio between cocaine seized and estimated to be produced in Colombia.
￿ πT: Ratio between cocaine seized and estimated to be produced (excluding Colom-
bia).
￿ πD: Ratio between the number of arrests due to drug possession and the number
of drug users. (Sources: What America￿s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (1988-
2000), Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Crime in the
United States: Uniform Crime Reports, 1989 - 2001).
￿ θ
D: Percentage of chronic and occasional cocaine users.(Source: National Institute
on Drug Abuse (1979￿1991)).
22Year Prevention Treatment Domestic Law International Interdiction Total
1986 0.3 1.1 1.8 0.2 1.2 4.5
1987 0.8 1.4 2.7 0.3 2.0 7.2
1988 0.8 1.4 3.0 0.3 1.4 6.9
1989 1.1 1.8 3.9 0.4 2.0 9.3
1990 1.8 2.4 5.7 0.7 2.3 12.9
1991 2.1 2.6 5.8 0.8 2.6 13.9
1992 2.1 2.9 6.4 0.8 2.4 14.6
1993 2.1 3.0 7.1 0.6 1.8 14.5
1994 2.1 3.1 7.1 0.4 1.5 14.2
1995 2.0 3.3 7.9 0.3 1.4 15.0
1996 1.8 3.1 8.1 0.3 1.5 14.8
1997 2.0 3.3 8.5 0.4 1.8 16.2
1998 2.3 3.5 9.0 0.5 1.7 17.0
1999 2.0 3.0 9.1 0.6 1.9 16.6
2000 2.1 3.1 8.6 0.8 2.4 17.0
2001 2.5 3.2 9.2 0.6 2.0 17.6
2002 2.0 3.0 3.1 1.0 1.8 11.0
2003 1.8 3.1 2.8 1.0 1.8 10.5
Average 13.2 21.0 45.4 4.6 15.8 100.0
Table 7: Distribution of the United States Government Expenditures in Marijuana, Cocaine,
Crack, Stimulants, LSD, PCP, and Heroin Control (billions of US dollars of the year 2000).





















Table 8: Relative Prices.
Year πE πP πT πD θ
D
1986 1.2 16.6
1987 2.3 2.6 17.3
1988 2.0 5.2 20.1
1989 3.2 8.0 22.1 2.5
1990 9.1 10.1 23.3 2.4 2.7
1991 7.0 13.7 17.5 2.0 2.9
1992 4.7 6.3 22.5 2.5 2.2
1993 3.5 5.6 23.2 2.8 2.0
1994 6.0 6.7 35.6 3.5 1.9
1995 12.5 7.6 27.5 3.8 1.9
1996 10.2 7.1 31.4 3.7 2.0
1997 17.2 8.0 33.6 4.0 1.9
1998 24.1 15.5 3.7 1.9
1999 29.2 3.7 1.6




Average 16.9 7.5 24.2 3.2 2.0
T a b l e9 :R i s k s( i np e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s ) .
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